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Pursuant to Rule 35, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, U S WEST 
Communications, Inc. (hereinafter "U S WEST") petitions for rehearing. In this 
Petition, U S WEST describes with particularity the points of law and fact that the 
Court overlooked or misapprehended in its opinion dated May 12, 1992 
(hereinafter "the Opinions-Appendix A). This Petition is presented in good faith 
and not for the purpose of delay. 
I. THE COURTS HOLDING IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE EXCEPTIONS 
ADOPTED BY THE COURT AND WITH THE REMEDY SOUGHT BY THE 
PARTIES. 
In the Opinion, the Court adopted an exception to the rule against 
retroactive ratemaking relating to "unforeseeable and extraordinary increases or 
decreases in expense." (Opinion at 9) The theory underlying this exception is that 
"justice and equity require that adjustments be made for unforeseen windfalls 
and disasters not caused by the utility." Id. Thus, "[t]o achieve fairness, the 
exception allows the recoupment of such expenses. . . ." Id., emphasis added. 
The exception, therefore, allows recovery of the amount of the unforeseen and 
extraordinary increase or decrease in expense. 
The Court also made it clear that a rate of return is not an absolute limit on 
profits: 
The rate of return is neither a guarantee of nor a limit on profits. A utility 
should be rewarded for becoming more efficient through its own efforts. If 
the authorized rate of return were an absolute ceiling on profits, that 
objective would be subverted. 
Id. at 16, emphasis added. 
Yet, despite these principles, the Court held: 
[I]f on remand the Tax Reform Act of 1986 is found to have resulted in an 
unforeseeable and extraordinary decrease in expenses or if U. S. West is 
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found to have engaged in misconduct, we hold that U. S. West's earnings, 
to the extent they exceeded its authorized rate of return established in the 
1985 general rate case, should be refunded to U. S. West ratepayers. 
Id. at 16, emphasis added. Read literally, the holding would mandate that, if the 
unforeseen and extraordinary exception applies in a particular year, all earnings 
above the authorized return must be refunded, even if the extraordinary and 
unforeseen decrease in expense accounts for only a portion of the excess earnings. 
Thus, if a utility earned $10 million more than the authorized return in a 
particular year, but only $2 million was attributable to the extraordinary expense 
decrease, the Court's holding would seemingly require that the entire $10 million 
be refunded. Such a holding is patently unfair, is inconsistent with the Court's 
articulation of the exception and the objective of promoting efficiency, and its 
application will amount to a penalty rather than recoupment of earnings 
attributable to the extraordinary expense. 
The holding also goes far beyond what was requested by the parties. In oral 
argument before the Commission, Mr. Dryer, counsel for MCI, was asked to 
describe what Petitioners were requesting. He gave the following response: 
Well, if the Commission were to adopt the argument that this is not 
retroactive ratemaking but it's in the nature of reparations, then I believe 
the Commission could order a refund of the entire amount due to whatever 
factor that exceeded 14.2 percent which was the authorized rate of return. 
If, however, the Commission concludes that there is an exception to the 
doctrine of retroactive ratemaking for unforeseen events, then I think the 
amount would be restricted solely to the unforeseen event which was the 
passage of the 1986 Tax Reform Act. 
(R. 942, emphasis added) He later indicated that, if the unforeseen and 
extraordinary exception were adopted, the amount at risk "would be narrowly 
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limited to those truly unforeseen events."1 (R. 943) 
Finally, as noted in our Brief, the rule against retroactive ratemaking is 
constitutionally based. See Respondents* Brief at 28-29; accord South Central Bell 
Telephone Co. v. Louisiana Public Serv. Comm'n. 594 So. 2d 357 (La. 1992); 
Kansas Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Corp. Comm'n. 794 R2d 1165, 1170 (Kan. App. 
1990). By sanctioning the refund of earnings unrelated to the exception, the 
Court's action would violate both the rule against retroactive ratemaking and U S 
WEST's constitutional rights. 
Similarly, in a situation where "utility misconduct" exists, to the extent the 
Court's holding would require the refund of amounts above the authorized rate of 
return unrelated to the misconduct, the Court's holding would be unfair, would 
be inconsistent with the theory underlying the adoption of the exception, and 
would violate U S WEST's constitutional rights. 
U S WEST, therefore, requests that the Court rehear this issue and clarify 
1
 Counsel for Tel-America participated later in the oral argument and did not disagree 
with Mr. Dryer's statement. (R. 949 et seq.) Mr. Dryer also made it clear that refunds which 
would reduce earnings below 14.2% would be inappropriate and that earnings above 14.2% 
attributable to efficiencies and other matters within the control of the utility should be retained by 
the Company: 
The bottom line is 14.2 percent. That would be the trigger point to analyze the amount in 
excess, but it would be our position that if the excess is attributable to efficiencies or other 
actions over which the utility had control, then the benefit would inhere to the utility. 
(R. 974). In Combe v. Warren's Family Drive-Inns. 680 P.2d 733, 736 (Utah 1984), this Court stated: 
In law or in equity, a judgment must be responsive to the issues framed by the pleadings, 
and a trial court has no authority to render a decision on issues not presented for 
determination. Any findings rendered outsits the issues are a nullity. 
£££ Cornia v. Cornia. 546 P.2d 890, 893 (Utah 1976) ("[LJiberality in procedure . . . does not 
authorize granting of relief on issues neither raised nor tried.") 
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its holding so that only those earnings above the authorized rate of return 
attributable to the events giving rise to an exception to the rule against retroactive 
rate making are subject to refund. 
II. THE COURTS RULING ON THE ISSUE OF PETITIONERS' FAILURE TO 
RAISE UTILITY MISCONDUCT IN THEIR PETITIONS FOR 
REHEARING IS BASED ON A SERIOUS MISAPPREHENSION OF FACT. 
Utah Code Ann. Section 54-7-15(2)(b) explicitly states that no party can raise 
on appeal any ground not set forth in its petition for rehearing. In Utah 
Associated Municipal Power Systems v. Public Serv. Comm'n. 789 P.2d 298, 300 
(Utah 1990), this Court expressly reaffirmed the principle that "an issue is not 
preserved for consideration on appeal unless it has been specifically raised in a 
petition for rehearing before the PSC."2 (Emphasis added) 
In this case, neither Tel-America nor MCI raised the claim that the 
Commission erred in failing to hold a factual hearing on utility misconduct in its 
petition for rehearing. (R. 685-95) Yet, in their briefs, they raised the issue of 
utility misconduct and argued that the Commission erred in not holding such a 
hearing. (MCI Brief at 44-45, Tel-America Brief at 22) 
In ruling that MCI and Tel-America had satisfied Section 54-7-15(2)(b), the 
Court overlooked two important facts in the record that completely undercut the 
Court's conclusion. First, the Court quoted a portion of the Commission's 
November 1, 1988 order for the proposition that the Commission only wanted the 
parties to address the threshold legal question rather than specific facts relating 
to their claim for relief. (Opinion at 13) This conclusion overlooks another 
2 In Utah Dep't of Business Regulation v. Public Serv. Comm'n. 602 P.2d 696, 699 (Utah 
1979), this Court held that compliance with Section 54-7-15 is "a jurisdictional prerequisite to the 
grant of judicial review by this Court." 
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statement from the November 1, 1988 Commission order. After setting the filing 
date for the briefs of parties supporting the Request for Agency Action, the 
Commission defined the parameters of their briefs this way: 
Those parties making the Request for Agency Action and any intervenors 
who support the Request shall file legal memoranda in support of the relief 
sought in the Request. (R. 3, emphasis added) 
Thus, contrary to the Court's conclusion that the Commission asked the parties to 
only address the broad jurisdictional issues, the Commission specifically 
requested that they support their specific requests for relief. Second, the Court 
compounded this error by stating that the parties, in their briefs filed below, 
"focused on the legal issue whether the Commission had authority to grant any 
relief in light of the EBA case and not on the facts that might support any 
particular theory justifying relief." (Opinion at 13, emphasis added) The Court's 
conclusion that the briefs did not focus on facts that would support the misconduct 
theory is simply not supported by the record. In fact, MCI's Brief before the 
Commission contained a detailed factual recitation (R. 378-88) that served as the 
basis for the argument that "there is evidence to indicate that the Company has 
been less than forthcoming in providing sufficient information . . ." (R. 399) and 
to claim that "Mountain Bell actively frustrated the regulatory process" and 
"failed to advise the Commission that its earnings had exceeded its authorized 
rate of return." (R. 415) MCI made specific assertions of misconduct in its Brief 
in support of its specific claim that U S WEST should be estopped from relying on 
the rule against retroactive ratemaking.3 In response, U S WEST presented a 
3 In fact, the heading of the final section of MCI's Brief states: "Mountain Bell Should be 
Estopped from Raising the Rule Against Retroactive Ratemaking." (R. 415) 
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detailed factual discussion and a specific response to the allegations of 
misconduct. (R. 469-85) 
Having specifically raised the issue before the Commission and having failed 
to raise it in their petitions for rehearing, the issue was not preserved by MCI and 
Tel-America as required by Section 54-7-15. Because the Court's decision was based 
on a serious misapprehension of fact, U S WEST respectfully requests the Court to 
rehear this issue and rule, consistent with the explicit requirements of Section 54-7-
15, that the misconduct issue was not preserved. Because this issue was not 
preserved, the Court should reconsider its decision which appears to have been 
heavily influenced by unsubstantiated allegations of misconduct. 
III. THE COURT CONCLUDED THAT THE PROCEDURES FOLLOWED BY THE 
COMMISSION IN APPROVING REVENUE REDUCTIONS IN 1987 AND 
1988 WERE IRREGULAR, THIS CONCLUSION IS BASED ON 
MISAPPREHENSIONS OF BOTH LAW AND FACT. 
The Opinion states that the procedures followed by the Commission in 
approving the December 1987 tariff reduction and the 1988 stipulation were 
"irregular, if not illegal." (Opinion at 10) The Court also stated that "the fixing of 
utility rates by private negotiation with no findings of fact raises serious questions 
about the legality and integrity of the procedures the Commission employed." Id. at 
11. There are two problems with this conclusion. First, the orders approving both 
decreases are final and were not appealed by any party. Second, the Court's 
criticism of the procedural basis for the 1987 and 1988 rate reductions is unfounded, 
both factually and legally. 
With regard to the 1987 reduction, the Court characterized it as a 
"stipulation" between U S WEST and the Division. Id. at 4. While the Division 
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supported the reduction, such a characterization is incorrect since there was no 
stipulation between U S WEST and the Division. Procedurally, the reduction 
resulted from the filing by U S WEST of revised tariffs for five services4 that had the 
overall effect of lowering annual revenues by $9.02 million. (Appendix B). No party 
opposed the tariff reduction.5 Since the tariffs involved only rate reductions, the 
statute governing the filing was Section 54-7-12(4)(a): 
Notwithstanding any other provisions of this t i t le, any schedule, 
classification, practice, or rule filed with the commission that does not result 
in any rate increase shall take effect: 
(i) 30 days after the date of filing; or 
(ii) within any lesser time the commission may grant, subject to its 
authority after a hearing to suspend, alter, or modify that schedule, 
classification, practice, or rule. 
Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-12(4)(a) (1987),6 emphasis added. Section 54-7-12(4)(a) does 
not require a hearing to approve the kind of filing made by U S WEST, If the 
Commission is not required to take any action before a utility-proposed rate 
decrease takes effect, obviously there is no need for it to make findings regarding 
the decrease. 
The October 1988 rate reduction in Docket No. 88-049-07 was much more than 
a private negotiation between two parties. In fact, it was a detailed stipulation 
4
 The five services were residential basic exchange service, residential installation 
charges, long distance service, OUTWATS, and switched access service (which is the service 
purchased by MCI and Tel-America). 
5
 Both MCI and Tel-America were fully aware that U S WEST was proposing these tariff 
reductions - including a 35% reduction to U S WEST's rates to them - and did not oppose them. 
(See Appendix 12 to Respondents' Brief, at 2-3). 
6
 Section 54-7-12(4)(a) has been amended slightly since 1987; however, the changes to it are 
not substantive in nature. 
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entered into by nine of the ten parties to the proceeding, including U S WEST, the 
Division, Tel-America, and MCI.7 (R. 916-27) While the Committee of Consumer 
Services did not sign the Stipulation, it affirmatively stated that it did not object to 
it.8 This Stipulation and the Commission's Order did not end the rate case. 
Rather, they placed two rate decreases into effect pending full hearings in the 
matter, thus allowing significant rate decreases to become effective in the absence 
of a fully litigated proceeding.9 Had the parties not entered into the Stipulation, 
those reductions would have been significantly delayed. Thus, from the perspective 
of ratepayers, it is inappropriate to criticize the Commission's procedures, 
particularly when considered in light of Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-1, which states in 
part: 
(1) Informal resolution, by agreement of the parties, of matters before 
the commission is encouraged. 
7 The other signatories were Contel, a large independent local exchange carrier, the 
Exchange Carriers of Utah, an association representing all independent local exchange carriers 
in Utah, the Utah Telecommunications Management Association, a trade group representing 
larger users, and AT&T and U S Sprint, large interexchange carriers. 
8 In the October 13, 1988 Order approving the Stipulation, the Commission noted that a[t]he 
Stipulation was entered by all parties to this proceeding, with the exception of the Committee of 
Consumer Services which stated that it had no objection to the Stipulation." (R. 912; emphasis 
added) Neither that order nor the final order in Docket No. 88-049-07 was appealed by the 
Committee or any other party. 
9
 It is inappropriate to negatively contrast the terms of the August 1988 stipulation to the 
October 1988 stipulation. While the August stipulation would have reduced rates by an additional 
$5 million, it would also have completely resolved all revenue issues in the case and put in place 
an incentive regulation plan, under which no further rate reductions would have been made until 
1992. On the other hand, the October stipulation put in place rate reductions without resolving the 
rate case. Indeed, the rate case continued, with additional revenue reductions of $22 million in 
1989. It should also be remembered that the October 13 rate reduction took place only four months 
after the Division initiated the proceeding. In fully litigated proceedings prior to the amendment 
to section 54-7-12(3) to allow interim rate reductions, rate decreases would not normally be 
effective until much longer periods of time had elapsed since the filing. 
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(2) The commission may approve any agreement after considering 
the interests of the public and other affected persons. 
(3)(a) At any time before or during a hearing or proceeding before the 
commission, the parties, between themselves or with the commission 
or a commissioner, may engage in settlement conferences and 
negotiations. 
(b) The commission may adopt any settlement proposal of the 
parties and may enter an order based upon the proposal. 
The Commission's approval of the Stipulation, which had no opposition, was in full 
compliance with Section 54-7-1 and with prior precedent. In Utah Dept. of Admin. 
Services v. Public Serv. Comm'n. 658 P.2d 601, 613 (Utah 1983) rWexpro HI. this 
Court strongly supported the policy of encouraging settlements of controversies 
before regulatory agencies "since it avoids the delay and the public and private 
expense of litigation." 
The Court's Opinion creates a "Catch 22" for the entire rate process before the 
Commission. On the one hand, the Court was highly critical that the 1987 and 1988 
reductions were not based on detailed findings, which would have required detailed 
testimony and extensive hearings. On the other hand, the Court was even more 
critical of the Commission for not acting more expeditiously in reducing U S 
WESTs earnings. The two criticisms are inconsistent. Comprehensive hearings, 
detailed findings, full discovery and all the other attributes of due process require a 
great deal of time. Rapid action, on the other hand, requires parties to compromise 
their positions. In this case, the Commission's approval of the rate reductions 
provided benefits to ratepayers far faster than would have otherwise been achieved. 
To have required the Commission to fully develop the record in order to enter 
detailed findings would have delayed and utterly frustrated that effort. Because the 
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Court's ruling appears to mandate such an approach, U S WEST respectfully 
submits that it will cause profoundly negative impacts to the regulatory process. 
An issue related to the Court's criticism of the Commission's procedures is 
the inference that the Commission acted far differently than other regulatory 
commissions in dealing with the Tax Reform Act of 1986. In its Opinion, the Court 
stated that "[b]y August 1987, utility regulators in forty-three states and the District 
of Columbia had taken some action to reduce utility rates in response to the Act." 
(Opinion at 3) The clear implication of the Court's statement is that by August 1987 
rates had been reduced in forty-four regulatory jurisdictions in response to the Tax 
Reform Act. A further implication is that the Utah Commission, which was not 
one of the jurisdictions listed, was derelict in its duties. The source for the Court's 
statement was a Public Utilities Fortnightly article provided by MCI. (R. 111-18) 
That article and its detailed footnotes make it clear that in many of the jurisdictions 
reported, no rate reductions had taken place and that such changes would be 
considered in the context of the normal rate-making process.10 That is no different 
from the Utah Commission's handling of the matter. Furthermore, in many of the 
states, the rate reductions occurred only with regard to those utilities that were 
currently in general rate proceedings. Few of the rate reductions related to 
telephone companies, and those that did primarily involved companies in the midst 
of rate proceedings. The Utah Commission's actions were consistent with those of 
10 Arizona, for example, was listed as one of the forty-four jurisdictions. The footnote 
associated with Arizona states, in part: "No substantive action yet taken. The effect of TRA86 will 
be dealt with in the context of the general rate case proceedings of the state's larger investor-owned 
utilities." (R. 115, note 4) 
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many other jurisdictions.11 
A major premise of the Court's decision is tha t the Commission's 
procedures were improper and inadequate. Since that premise is not correct, U S 
WEST requests that the Court reconsider its decision. In addition, U S WEST 
requests that the Court explicitly clarify its decision by reaffirming its Wexpro II 
position encouraging the informal resolution of matters before the Commission. 
IV. THE COURTS UNRESTRICTED ADOPTION OF THE EXTRAORDINARY 
AND UNFORESEEABLE EXPENSE AND UTILITY MISCONDUCT 
EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULE AGAINST RETROACTIVE RATE MAKING 
VIOLATES U S WESTS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND CREATES A 
CLOUD ON U S WESTS ABILITY TO FINANCE. 
U S WEST has received and reported earnings in 1987 and 1988 based upon 
final Commission rate orders that were not appealed by any party. U S WEST 
argued that it could not be deprived of those earnings without violating the due 
process provisions of the state and federal constitutions (Respondents' Brief at 28-
29), but acknowledged in oral argument that a showing that U S WEST had 
defrauded the Commission could operate as an exception to this constitutional 
prohibition. The Opinion does not address this constitutional argument. 
Because it is unconstitutional and a violation of statute to order a utility to 
refund revenues collected pursuant to a final rate order (Respondents' Brief at 23-
31), any exception must be strictly drawn. While it is conceivable that an "act of 
God/' such as a severe storm, which occurs and is concluded before there is any 
reasonable possibility for prospective rate relief, might constitute an appropriate 
1 1
 The Public Utility Fortnightly article makes no effort to analyze or describe the 
difference in state laws in each jurisdiction. The law in a particular state can have a dramatic 
effect on the remedies available to a regulatory agency in dealing with situations like the Tax 
Reform Act. 
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exception, an event like the Tax Reform Act which altered tax rates prospectively 
on a continuing basis is not an appropriate exception. 
Likewise, the Opinion's adoption of a "misconduct" exception to the rule 
against retroactive ratemaking is overly broad. U S WEST has conceded 
throughout this case that revenues collected pursuant to a final order would be 
subject to refund to the extent that they were based upon fraudulent 
misrepresentations or omissions by the utility. The three cases cited in the Opinion 
all involved allegations of fraudulent conduct. The "utility misconduct" exception 
adopted by the Court does not define "misconduct" or require a finding of intent on 
the part of the utility, and is, therefore, so vague as to violate the due process rights 
of a utility. In addition, it cuts only one way. If a party seeking lower rates than 
supported by the utility is successful in achieving its aims through fraudulent 
misrepresentation or omission, the rates ought to be subject to surcharge. 
The Court's failure to precisely and narrowly define its exceptions to the rule 
against retroactive rate making seriously impairs the constitutional protection of 
the rule. 
Furthermore, if the rule against retroactive rate making is to have as many 
potential loopholes as these overly broad and vague standards would suggest, it is 
hard to imagine a situation in which anyone can rely upon the finality of a rate 
order. As pointed out in our brief (Respondents' Brief 29-31), it is in the interests of 
the utility, its customers and its investors to have finality in rate orders. The lack of 
finality created by the opinion is particularly problematic for utility investors. As 
noted in Indiana Tel. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 171 N.H2d 111, 124 (Ind. App. 
1960) and State ex rel. Standard Oil of Calif, v. Den't of Public Works. 53 P.2d 318, 
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319 (Wash. 1936), a public utility's ability to attract capital or make investments is 
seriously undermined if final rate orders are subject to adjustment after-the-fact. 
For the foregoing reasons, U S WEST requests that the Court reconsider its 
adoption of the two exceptions to the rule against retroactive rate making. If the 
Court concludes that the exceptions should be adopted, U S WEST respectfully 
requests that the Court define the exceptions more precisely and narrowly to limit 
the potential for their misapplication. U S WEST requests the opportunity to brief 
this issue further. 
V. THE COURTS CONCLUSION THAT ALL CUSTOMERS SHOULD BENEFIT 
FROM ANY REMEDY IS ERRONEOUS. 
The Opinion concludes that a[a]ny refund of excess earnings that might be 
appropriate . . . must not be solely for the named petitioners; all of U.S. West's 
ratepayers are entitled to the benefit of any remedy the Commission finds to be 
appropriate." (Opinion at 16) The only support in the Opinion for this striking 
result is the reference that "MCFs and Tel-America's petitions for rehearing stated 
that they were filed for and on behalf of all petitioners and all customers of U. S. 
West." Id. at 14. Although the Court's observation about the petitions for rehearing 
is correct (R. 684, 694), the mere assertion by Tel-America and MCI, who are 
interexchange carriers and competitors of U S WEST, that they were acting in a 
representative capacity on behalf of all ratepayers, does not grant them that status. 
To act in a representative capacity, a person must either have statutory 
authority to do so or must have complied with Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
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Procedure.12 Rule 23 prescribes the procedures that must be followed if a party 
wishes to act in a representative capacity. See Workman v. Nagle Construction. 802 
P.2d 749, 753 (Utah 1990). Neither Tel-America nor MCI ever purported to comply 
with these requirements. Rule 23 applies to Commission proceedings. Utah 
Admin. Code R750-100-1.G. 
The conclusion of the Opinion that all U S WEST ratepayers are entitled to 
the benefit of any remedy was not briefed or argued by the parties and is based upon 
a misapprehension of both law and fact. U S WEST respectfully requests that the 
Court grant rehearing to correct this error. 
CONCLUSION 
The Opinion effects far-reaching changes in the regulation of public 
utilities in this state based upon a serious misapprehension of both law and fact. 
Without the benefit of appeal or briefing of the issues involved in a series of rate 
reduction orders of the Public Service Commission, the Court concluded that U S 
WEST achieved excessive earnings as a result of the Commission's failure to 
respond to the Tax Reform Act of 1986 and fashioned a remedy consistent with 
that erroneous conclusion. It is respectfully submitted that the Court erred in 
considering issues not properly before it and in modifying principles of law which 
have served the state well for many years. U S WEST respectfully requests that 
12 Here, the only parties statutorily authorized to act in a representative capacity are the 
Committee, the Division, and the Commission. Utah Code Ann. §§ 54-4-1 et seq.. 54-4a-l(l)(b) & 54-
10-4(3). Although the Committee joined in the Request for Agency Action, it did not file a 
memorandum or present argument below and it did not join in the appeal of the Commission's 
order. The Division, which is charged with representing the general public interest, did appear 
and opposed the Request below and on appeal. The Commission's order was the subject of this 
appeal, and the Commission appeared in defense of its order. 
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the Court rehear the case and correct these errors. 
Dated this 26th day of May 1992. 
v ^ A^^Luy^\^LA>jtJL 
Ted D. Smith 
9?7<w^ 
'GregiM-y Ej(Monson 
Attorneys for U S WEST 
Communications, Inc. 
15 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, pursuant to 
Rule 26, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, four true and correct copies of the 
foregoing Petition for Rehearing of U S WEST Communications, Inc. (formerly 
The Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company) to the following on this 
26th day of May, 1992. 
Thomas M. Zarr 
Stanley K. Stoll 
Daniel D. Hill 
Snow, Christensen & Martineau 
10 Exchange Place, Suite 1100 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Randy L. Dryer 
Jim Butler 
Parsons, Behle & Latimer 
Post Office Box 11898 
186 South State Street, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, UT 84147-0898 
Michael L. Ginsberg 
Assistant Attorney General 
Division of Public Utilities 
1100 Beneficial Life Tower 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
David L. Stott 
Public Service Commission of Utah 
160 East 300 South, 4th Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
> ^ A A J CK'V^A^XA^V 
16 
APPENDICES 
A. Opinion of May 12,1992 
B. Order of December 10,1987. Docket No. 87-049-T35 
APPENDIX A 
OPINION OF MAY 12,1992 
This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
00O00 
MCI Telecommunications Corp., 
Petitioner, 
No. 890251 
v. 
Public Service Commission of 
Utah; Brian T. Stewart, 
Chairman, James M. Byrne, 
Commissioner, 
Respondents* 
Tel-America of Salt Lake City, 
Inc., 
Petitioner, 
N o . ' 890252 
F I L E D 
May 1 2 , 1992 
v. 
Public Service Commission of 
Utah; Brent HL Cameron, 
Commissioner; James M. Byrne, 
Commissioner; Brian T. Stewart, 
Chairman, 
Respondents. Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk 
Original Proceeding in this Court 
Attorneys: Gregory B. Monson, C. Scott Brown, Salt Lake 
City, for Mountain States Telephone 
Ted D. Smith, Salt Lake City, for U.S. West 
Communications 
David L. Stott, Laurie L. Noda, Salt Lake City, 
for Public Service Commission 
Randy L. Dryer, Jim Butler, Salt Lake City, for 
MCI Telecommunications 
Thomas M. Zarr, Stanley K. Stoll, Daniel D. Hill, 
Salt Lake City, for Tel-America 
Michael L. Ginsberg, Salt Lake City, for Division 
of Public Utilities 
STEWART, Justice: 
In 1985, the Public Service Commission (Commission) 
granted Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co-, now U.S. 
West Corp. (U.S. West),1 a $22 million general rate increase 
and established 14.2% as its authorized rate of return on 
equity- In granting the increase, the Commission assumed that 
U.S. West would pay a federal corporate income tax of 46%, the 
then-existing rate. 
On October 22, 1986, Congress enacted the Tax Reform 
Act of 1986 (Act), which provided a two-step reduction in the 
federal corporate income tax rate, from 46% to 40% effective 
June 1987, and then to 34% effective January 1988. This 
amounted to a total reduction of aproximately 26%. 
In December 1986, the Commission requested^that the 
major utilities in the state provide it with information 
showing the anticipated effect of the reduced income tax rates 
on their earnings. The president of U.S. West responded that 
although the initial impact on cash flow would be negative, 
"the tax law is a critical factor in averting rate requests.11 
He further stated, "Considering all of the data, I feel very 
good about the possibility of rate stability for our customers 
over the next few years. The benefits of the 1986 Tax Reform 
Act will go to ratepayers since they work to offset intrastate 
increases in our continuously changing industry." In January 
1987, the Commission requested that the Utah Division of Public 
Utilities (Division) review the responses of the companies. 
The Division recommended that the Commission not order U.S. 
West to reduce its rates. The Commission then directed the 
Division to undertake a formal investigation of U.S. West/s 
rate of return. 
The Committee of Consumer Services (Committee) was 
created by the Legislature to serve as "advocate . . . of 
positions most advantageous to a majority of residential 
consumers." Utah Code Ann. § 54-10-4(3) (1990). On June 1, 
1987, the Committee filed a motion with the Commission asking 
it to declare the rates of all public utilities subject to the 
Commission's jurisdiction interim rates or, alternatively, to 
require them to establish refund reserve accounts from which 
excess earnings could be refunded to ratepayers. The 
Commission denied the motion on June 30, 1987, referring in 
part to the Division's report that U.S. West's rate of return 
for 1986 and 1987 would be less than 13% and 12% respectively, 
less than its authorized rate of 14.2%. The Division 
represented that the net effect of the Act on U.S. West's 
earnings would be an increase of $1.2 million in 1987 and $0.5 
1. Mountain Bell became U.S. West Corp. in 1988. We will use 
the name "U.S. West" throughout this opinion for ease of 
reference. 
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million in 1988. The Division also reported that it was 
monitoring U.S. West's earnings on a monthly basis and would 
alert the Commission to any significant changes. 
By August 1987, utility regulators in forty-three 
states and the District of Columbia had taken some action to 
reduce utility rates in response to the Act. 
On August 11, 1987, the Committee requested that U.S. 
West disclose its earnings. U.S. West objected on the ground 
that the Division was already monitoring its earnings. The 
Committee then moved to compel U.S. West to respond to the 
request for data. The Commission ruled in November 1987 that 
the motion to compel would be held in abeyance pending 
completion of the Division7s investigation, .but that in the 
meantime the Division should give the Committee the financial 
information it had obtained from U.S. West. 
On September 1, 1987, the Division filed a second 
report with the Commission indicating that U.S. West's rate of 
return remained below its 14.2% authorized rate of return. 
Again, the Division recommended that the Commission take no 
action. 
The Division's conclusions appear to have been 
seriously in error. U.S. West's actual rate return had 
exceeded its authorized rate of return in six of the first 
eight months of 1987, even though the first phase of the 
federal tax reduction was not effective until June 1987. Data 
furnished by U.S. West to MCI Telecommunications Corporation in 
September 1988 in response to interrogatories provided the 
following monthly breakdown for U.S. West's return on equity 
for its Utah intrastate operations: 
Month 1987 1988 
January 
February 
March 
April 
May 
June 
July 
August 
September 
October 
November 
December 
12.02% 
15.14% 
3.52% 
15.00% 
16.62% 
17.86% 
16.24% 
25.31% 
20.76% 
17.24% 
19.89% 
24.48% 
17.23% 
15.62% 
22.04% 
16.23% 
12.29% 
16.02% 
As is evident from these figures, U.S. West's rate of return 
increased dramatically after the first phase of the tax reduc-
tion became effective. For the last six months of 1987, U.S. 
West's average monthly rate of return on equity was over 20%. 
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In December 1987, the Division and U.S. tyest privately 
negotiated a $9 million reduction in future rates to be 
effective January 1, 1988. The Commission approved the 
stipulation without a hearing or findings of fact to justify 
the amount of reduction and without disclosing what U.S. West's 
earnings had been in 1987, what they would likely be in 1988, 
or by how much they exceeded the authorized rate of return. 
Subsequent events disclosed that the $9 million 
reduction was inadequate to reduce U.S. West's earnings to its 
authorized rate of return. U.S. West's high rate of earnings 
continued for the first six months of 1988. During that 
period, its average monthly earnings were in excess of a 16% 
rate of return, even with the January 1987 rate reduction. 
Thus, U.S. West's earnings significantly exceeded its 
authorized rate of return for each of the twelve months 
following the effective date of the first phase of the tax 
reductions under the Act. 
On January 28, 1988, the Committee requested that U.S. 
West produce the financial data on which the $9 million rate 
reduction was negotiated. This request was made after the 
second phase of the tax reduction became effective. U.S. West 
responded that it considered the investigation closed and 
refused to disclose the data. The Committee then hired an 
independent consulting firm to review both the settlement and 
U.S. West's earnings. In May 1988, the firm issued a report 
asserting that the $9 million stipulated rate reduction was 
"clearly inadequate." 
In July 1988, the Commission initiated a general rate 
case, docket No. 88-049-07, to investigate the reasonableness 
of U.S. West's rates and earnings. Again the Commission denied 
the Committee's request to declare U.S. West's rates interim 
rates. Instead, the Commission ruled that if U.S. West's 
earnings were in excess of its authorized rate of return, they 
would beT.subject to a rebuttable presumption that they were 
unjust and unreasonable and subject to refund. In August 1988, 
the Division, the Committee, and U.S. West stipulated to a 
further rate reduction of $31 million, a $20 million reduction 
to be effective September 1, 1988, and an $11 million reduction 
to be effective January 1, 1989. 
On September 22, 1988, the Commission, with no 
findings of fact, rejected the stipulated reduction and ordered 
an interim rate reduction of only $27 million, $16 million of 
which would be effective August 1, 1988, and $11 million of 
which would be effective January 1, 1989. 
Then, in October 1988, the Commission, at U.S. West's 
request, vacated its September 22 order reducing rates by 
$27 million—again with no findings of fact—and instead 
approved a stipulation for a permanent reduction of 
Nos. 890251, 890252 4 
$26 million, $16 million to be effective September 22, 1988, 
and $10 million to be effective January 1, 1989. The 
Commission, also at U.S. West's request, vacated its August 2 
order declaring that earnings in excess of U.S. West's 
authorized rate of return were presumptively unjust and 
unreasonable and subject to refund. In addition, the parties 
agreed that there would be no further demands for interim rate 
decreases pending the conclusion of the general rate case, and 
the Commission approved the agreement, again without findings. 
Finally, one year later, in October 1989, after formal 
hearings and extensive findings of fact and conclusions of law, 
the Commission entered still another rate reduction order of 
almost $22 million to be effective November 15, 1989. 
Thus, over a period of approximately two years, the 
Commission entered three orders reducing U.S. West^s rates in a 
four-step process by a total of $57 million. The reductions 
were apparently due, at least in part, to the fact that the Tax 
Reform Act had decreased U.S. West's federal tax liability, 
thereby increasing its earnings to a level significantly in 
excess of its authorized rate of return. 
While the Commission was considering the stipulation 
on which the October 1988 rate reduction was based, David 
Irvine, a U.S. West ratepayer and former PSC Commissioner, 
filed a request for agency action, asking the Commission to 
(1) investigate U.S. West's rate of return for the years 1987 
and 1988, and (2) order U.S. West to refund to the ratepayers 
all earnings exceeding the 14.2% authorized rate of return. 
The Commission subsequently granted MCI Telecommunications 
Corp. (MCI) , Tel-America of Salt Lake City, Inc. (Tel-America) , 
and other interested parties, including a number of members of 
the Utah Legislature, leave to join in the request. 
The Commission severed the request for agency action 
from the:%g£neral rate case and assigned the request for agency 
action docket tto. 88-049-18. The Commission denied the relief 
sought by the requestr. Although the Commission found that U.S. 
West's earnings had exceeded its authorized rate of return for 
the period in question, it did not state by how much. It did 
state, however, that the Tax Reform Act was a cause of the 
overearnings. The Coiamission ruled that it had no authority to 
order a refund because a refund would constitute retroactive 
rate making in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-4(1) and 
Utah Department of Business Regulation v. Public Service 
Commission. 720 P.2d 420 (Utah 1986). 
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Utah Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA), Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 63-46b-l to -22 (1989), establishes the 
appropriate standards of review. UAPA applies to all agency 
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adjudicative proceedings commenced on or after January 1, 
1988. Id. § 63-46b-22(l). 
The primary issues to be resolved are whether the 
Commission erred in (1) ruling that there is no applicable 
exception to the rule against retroactive rate making for 
unforeseeable and extraordinary events, and (2) ruling that 
there was no basis for a factual inquiry into whether U.S. West 
engaged in misconduct by presenting misleading information on 
actual and projected earnings or by improperly avoiding 
disclosure of its earnings. Both issues are questions of law, 
subject to de novo review. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4) (d) ; 
Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 754 
P.2d 928, 930 (Utah 1988). 
II. EXCEPTIONS TO THE PROHIBITION AGAINST 
RETROACTIVE RATE MAKING 
As a general proposition, a utility's recoupment of 
costs that were greater than projected or revenues that were 
less than projected from future rates constitutes retroactive 
rate making. The leading case in this" jurisdiction prohibiting 
retroactive rate making is Utah Department of Business 
Regulation v. Public Service Commission, 720 P.2d 420 (Utah 
1986) [hereinafter EBA]. Utah Power & Light Co. had 
established an energy balancing account (eba account), an 
accounting device created to facilitate interim rate increases 
to compensate for rapidly escalating fuel costs. Utah Power 
transferred greater than expected revenues that had accrued in 
the eba account to general revenues. The purpose of the 
transfer was to benefit the stockholders. If left in the eba 
account, the increased revenues would have benefited the 
ratepayers. Utah Power argued that the transfer was an 
accounting adjustment, not retroactive rate making, that the 
ratepayers would reap a windfall if the unexpected revenues 
remained in the eba account, and that, even with the transfer, 
Utah Power -shareholders would receive a lower return on equity 
(13.25%) than the authorized rate (16.3%). 
The Court held that Utah Power could not transfer the 
unanticipated increased revenues out of the eba account to 
benefit the stockholders. The Court stated that in a general 
rate proceeding utility rates are fixed on the basis of 
projected costs and revenues for a future "test" year. 
Although the Legislature had specifically authorized interim 
rate increases to adjust for rapidly increasing fuel costs in a 
bob-tailed rate proceeding, the Court held that the utility 
could not recoup lost earnings caused by costs greater than 
projected or by revenues less than projected in the prior rate 
case. The Court reasoned that "neither the pass-through 
legislation nor the Commission's general grant of regulatory 
authority permits a utility to have retroactive revenue 
adjustments in order to guarantee shareholders the rate of 
return initially anticipated." EBA, 720 P.2d at 423. 
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The Court explained that the prohibition against 
retroactive rate making is designed to provide utilities with 
an incentive to operate efficiently. For that reason, 
utilities are not allowed to recoup unanticipated costs or 
unrealized revenues. 
This process places both the utility and 
the consumers at risk that the rate-making 
procedures have not accurately predicted 
costs and revenues. If the utility 
underestimates its costs or overestimates 
revenues, the utility makes less money. 
By the same token, if a utility's revenues 
exceed expectations or if costs are below 
predictions, the utility keeps the 
excess. Overestimates and underestimates 
are then taken into account at the next 
general rate proceeding in an attempt to 
arrive at a just and reasonable future 
rate. 
EBA, 720 P.2d at 420-21 (citations omitted). Therefore, "[t]he 
bar on retroactive rate making makes no exception for missteps 
in the rate-making process," even though the projections of 
expenses and revenues for the test year will necessarily vary 
from actual experience. Id. at 424. 
A. Exception For Extraordinary and Unforeseeable 
Expenses or Revenues 
MCI and Tel-America acknowledge the general rule 
against retroactive rate making, but argue that the instant 
case falls within an exception that applies when an 
unforeseeable event results in an extraordinary increase or 
decrease in expenses or revenues. 
A number of courts have recognized the exception for 
unforeseeable and extraordinary increases in a utility's 
expenses. Increased expenses from natural disasters, such as 
extreme weather conditions, and other extraordinary events are 
the typical bases for the exception. See, e.g., Office of 
Consumer Advocate v. Iowa State Commerce Comm'n. 428 N.W.2d 
302, 306-07 (Iowa 1988) (one-time assessment for permanent 
storage of nuclear waste under Nuclear Waste Act of 1982 was 
extraordinary, unforeseeable expense); Narraaansett Elec. Co. 
v. Burke, 415 A.2d 177, 178-80 (R.I. 1980) (extraordinary ice 
storm); In re Green Mountain Power Corp., 519 A.2d 595, 597-99 
(Vt. 1986) (unscheduled shutdown of nuclear plant extraordinary 
expense) ; Wisconsin's Environmental Decade, Inc. v. Public 
Serv.. Comm'n. 298 N.W.2d 205, 212 (Wis. Ct. App. 1980) (severe 
ice storm); Re Kansas City Power & Light Co., 75 Pub. Util. 
Rep. 4th (PUR) 1, 38-41 (Mo. Pub. Serv. Comm. 1986) (severe ice 
storm); Re Kansas City Power & Light Co., 55 Pub. Util. Rep. 
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4th (PUR) 468, 480-81 (Mo, Pub. Serv. Comm. 1983) (power outage 
caused by interruption of water supply to boiler). In Green 
Mountain Power, the Vermont Supreme Court explained the 
rationale for the exception: 
"If this treatment is not to be permitted, 
not only would there be a serious question 
as to whether the Company has been 
afforded a fair opportunity to earn a 
reasonable rate of return, it would also 
imply the need for an upward revision of 
the rate of return in all cases in the 
future. Such a revision, of course, would 
have to be based on a prediction of 
inherently unpredictable events—the 
occurrence of extraordinary plant 
shut-downs." 
The Board's conclusion was correct. 
Once it is clear that a particular cost is 
"extraordinary" and that it does not 
result from company mismanagement,. or 
imperfect forecasts, treatment of such 
costs through appropriate amortization in 
future rate determinations does not 
constitute a "true-up" of past calcula-
tions, because a truly extraordinary cost 
by definition would not be factored into 
the original rate* 
Green Mountain Power, 519 A. 2d at 597 (citations omitted) 
(emphasis in original) (quoting Order of Vermont Public Service 
Board); accord Burke, 415 A.2d at 178-79. 
The exception has been applied not only to 
unforeseeable and extraordinary increases in expenses, but also 
to unforeseeable and extraordinary decreases in expenses. See, 
e.g. , Re Narragansett Elec. Co. , 57 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 
549, 558 (R.I. Pub. Utils. Comm. 1984) (excess earnings due to 
"unanticipated economic recovery and unforeseeable weather"); 
see also Chesapeake and Potomac Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. 
Common, 514 A. 2d 1159, 1170 (D.C. 1986) (reimbursement of 
license contract payments previously paid to AT&T); Turpen v. 
Oklahoma Corp. Comm'n, 769 P.2d 1309, 1332 (Okla. 1988) (AT&T's 
reimbursement to subject utility was unexpected windfall). 
The extraordinary and unforeseeable nature of the 
expenses recognized under the exception differentiates them 
from expenses inaccurately estimated because of a misstep in 
the rate-making process, such as the inability to predict 
precisely, or from mismanagement. An increase or decrease in 
expenses that is unforeseeable at the time of a rate-making 
proceeding cannot, by hypothesis, be taken into account in 
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fixing just and reasonable rates. Furthermore, because the 
increase or decrease must have an extraordinary effect on the 
utility's earnings, the increase or decrease will necessarily 
be outside the normal range of variance that occurs in 
projecting future expenses. 
If a rate-making body were to attempt to make 
allowance for an unforeseeable and extraordinary increase or 
decrease in expenses in fixing rates, a task that by definition 
is impossible, the resulting rates would always be unjust and 
unreasonable, if not confiscatory or exploitive, as to either 
ratepayers or stockholders. To achieve fairness, the exception 
allows recoupment of such expenses either in future rates or in 
some other appropriate fashion. 
The rule stated in the EBA case is a sound rate-making 
principle, but it only applies to "missteps in the ratermaking 
process." It does not apply where justice and equity require 
that adjustments be made for unforeseen windfalls or disasters 
not caused by the utility. We emphasize that the exception for 
unforeseeable and extraordinary events cannot be invoked simply 
because a utility experiences expenses that are greater or 
revenues that are less than those projected in the general rate 
proceeding. 
In the instant case, the Commission held that the rule 
against retroactive rate making barred any relief sought by the 
request for agency action and that no exception to the rule was 
applicable. The Commission did not specifically state, 
however, whether there was an exception for unforeseeable and 
extraordinary expenses. We now hold that the exception for 
unforeseeable and extraordinary increases or decreases in 
expenses is recognized in this state. 
We also hold that the Commission's refusal to allow 
petitioners a factual hearing on whether the exception applies 
was error-. The extent of the reduction of corporate income tax 
rates under the Act was clearly unforeseeable when the last 
general rate case was decided in 1985. Ordinarily, changes in 
tax laws are not a sufficient basis for invoking the exception 
to the general rule. Here, however, the federal corporate 
income tax rate was cut by more than one-fourth. As the United 
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 
commented in connection with the Act, "The change in [Carolina 
Power & Light Company's] tax costs at issue here was caused by 
an act of Congress (one only marginally more foreseeable than 
an act of God)." Carolina Power & Light Co. v. FERC. 860 F.2d 
1097, 1102 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 
U.S. West, the Division, and the Commission argue that 
the Act was foreseeable and that "the Commission and the 
Division foresaw the potential impact of the [Act] and acted 
responsibly in attempting to deal with it." The Commission, 
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however, did not foresee the Tax Reform Act in the general rate 
case in 1985. In factr that case assumed a federal tax rate of 
46%. 
Moreover, it appears that the Commission seriously 
misappraised the effect of the Act after it was enacted, as 
evidenced by the gross inadequacy of the 1987 rate reduction. 
There is even doubt that the Commission accurately foresaw the 
effect of the Act in 1988 when it agreed to a $26 million rate 
reduction, and only a few months later, to another $20 million 
reduction. Even if we agreed with the Commission that it 
foresaw the effect of the tax reduction and took action to 
remedy it in 1987, it is clear that the Commission did not 
understand the full effect of the Act with sufficient clarity 
to remedy U.S. West's overearnings. Whether that failure was a 
result of U.S. West's failure to disclose relevant financial 
data and projections promptly should be explored on, remand• 
Not only did the Commission fail to foresee the effect 
of the Act, but there is significant evidence, at least on this 
record, that the Act provided an extraordinary decrease in U.S. 
West's expenses and a corresponding extraordinary increase in 
earnings. 
Furthermore, whether the Commission and the Division 
acted responsibly in attempting to deal with the effects of the 
Act, as the Commission asserted, is problematic. The 
Commission's procedural handling of U.S. West's excessive 
earnings in the 1987 and 1988 rate reductions was irregular, if 
not illegal. The only explanation given by the Commission for 
the 1987 and 1988 rate reductions is found in its order denying 
the amended request for agency action, where the Commission 
stated that U.S. West ,fearn[ed] in excess of its authorized 
rate of return in calendar years 1989 and 1988," and the only 
explanation the Commission has given for the overearnings is, 
"One- of the reasons for the over-earning was the impact upon 
U.S. West: of the Tax Reform Act of 1986." These explanations 
are clearly inadequate. The Commission has never indicated 
what U.S. West's actual earnings and rate of return were for 
the years in question, by how much its actual rate of return 
exceeded the authorized rate of return, what rate of return the 
1987 and 1988 rate reductions were intended to produce, why the 
reductions were stretched out over three steps, whether the 
reductions were intended to reduce U.S. West's earnings to the 
level authorized in the December 1985 general rate case or to 
some other level, or whether the Commission allowed U.S. West 
to offset the decrease in taxes by increases in other expense 
items not associated with the Act. 
The Commission sought to explain its delayed response 
to U.S. West's overearnings by stating that the Division 
initially indicated that its analysis of U.S. West's financial 
data would reveal off-sets to the income tax reduction and it 
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suggested no need for Commission action. The Commission 
stated, M[T]he Division made a good faith effort to accurately 
and correctly analyze the information provided to it by the 
utility.11 That finding begs the question whether U.S. West 
promptly disclosed sufficiently specific and accurate financial 
information, a question the Commission has not addressed. 
Moreover, the fixing of utility rates by private 
negotiation with no findings of fact raises serious questions 
about the legality and integrity of the procedures the 
Commission employed. The Commission serves a crucial role in 
protecting ratepayers from overreaching by entities with 
monopoly power that provide essential services. We have on 
many occasions emphasized that the Commission must make 
appropriate findings of fact to justify rate orders. In Utah 
Department of Business Regulation v. Public Service Commission, 
614 P.2d 1242, 1245 (Utah 1980), we stated that the first 
prerequisite of a rate order is that it be preceded by a 
hearing and findings. We explained: 
A state regulatory commission, whose 
powers have been invoked to fix a 
reasonable rate, is entitled to know and 
before it can act advisedly must be 
informed of all relevant facts. 
Otherwise, the hands of the regulatory 
body could be tied in such fashion it 
could not effectively determine whether a 
proposed rate was justified. 
Id. at 1246. Although Department of Business Regulation dealt 
with an effort to increase rates, the same principle applies 
here, where the Commission acted to decrease rates. In that 
case, we emphasized the importance of adherence to proper 
procedures and specifically condemned procedures of the type 
employed here: 
In summary, there is no provision in 
the Public Utilities Act which precludes 
the authority of the P.S.C. to conduct an 
abbreviated proceeding to adjust a utility 
rate or charge, but any rate so adjusted 
must be predicated upon a finding that 
such adjusted rate is just and 
reasonable. In turn, this finding must be 
supported by substantial evidence 
concerning every significant element in 
the rate making components (expense or 
investment) which is claimed by the 
applicant as the basis to justify a rate 
adjustment. 
Id. at 1249-50. 
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Service Commission, 720 P.2d 1373, 1378 (Utah 1986), we stated 
that the Commission cannot discharge its statutory 
responsibilities without making findings on both ultimate and 
subordinate issues of fact. Once again, we emphasized that the 
Commission's regulation of public monopolies must strictly 
adhere to those procedures designed to give appropriate 
protection to the interests of ratepayers, investors, the 
utilities themselves, and where they exist, competitors. Id. 
Moreover, unless the Commission complies with those procedures, 
this Court cannot perform its assigned task of judicial 
review. Id. ; Mountain States Legal Found, v. Utah Public Serv. 
Common/ 636 P. 2d 1047, 1058 (Utah 1981). 
Here, the Commission issued two orders that reduced 
U.S. West's rates by a total of $35 million with no findings of 
fact on either subordinate or ultimate factual issues 
pertaining to the reasonableness of the reduction or to the 
reasonableness of the rates that went into effect after the 
reduction. Given the sequence of the Commission's orders and 
rate reductions, it seems highly likely that the first two 
reductions were not sufficient to offset the effect of the 
reduced income tax rate. In any event, it appears that by 
reducing the rates in a three-step manner the Commission 
allowed U.S. West to collect excessive rates and earnings, at 
least until all the reductions finally went into effect. 
On remand, the Commission should make factual findings 
on all relevant issues. Its findings must, at a minimum, 
include (1) U.S. West's earnings and rate of return for the 
years 1986, 1987, 1988, and 1989 and the earnings and profits 
that would have been realized but for the stipulated rate 
reductions in 1987 and 1988; (2) the extent to which U.S. 
West's earnings exceeded the authorized rate of return in 1987, 
1988, and 1989, both with and without the stipulated rate 
reductions; (3) the amount of the decrease in U.S. West's 
federal corporate income tax liabilities for the years 1987, 
1988, and i989 as a result of the decrease in the federal tax 
rates compared with what U.S. West's tax liabilities would have 
been under the federal corporate income tax rates in effect in 
December 1985; (4) the amount, if any, of increased expenses or 
decreased revenues that were offset against U.S. West's tax 
savings in negotiating the 1987 and 1988 rate reductions and 
whether they should have been allowed under the EBA case to 
"true up" past projections; and (5) whether U.S. West was 
cooperative, accurate, and forthright in the information 
provided and representations made to the Committee, the 
Division, and the Commission, including its initial 
representation by the president of U.S. West as to the expected 
effect of the Act. 
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B- Utility Misconduct as an Exception to 
the Rule Against Retroactive Rate Making 
Petitioners also argue that the rule against 
retroactive rate making does not bar a refund of earnings 
obtained as a result of utility misconduct and that the 
Commission acted arbitrarily and capriciously in not holding a 
hearing on whether U.S. West was guilty of misconduct in not 
providing timely, accurate, and specific information as to its 
actual or projected earnings for 1987 and 1988. 
Before addressing the substantive issues, we address a 
procedural question. The Commission, the Division, and U.S. 
West argue that petitioners failed to raise in their petitions 
for rehearing the issue whether the Commissipn erred in failing 
to hold a factual hearing on the allegation that U.S. West 
engaged in misconduct. Under Utah Code Ann. § 54-7rl5(2)(a) 
and (b) , an issue must be presented to the Commission in a 
petition for rehearing to be raised on appeal.2 See 
Hi-Country Homeowners Ass'n v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 779 P.2d 
682, 683-84 (Utah 1989); Williams v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 754 
P. 2d 41, 46 (Utah 1988); Utah Dep't of Business Regulation v. 
Public Serv. Comm'n, 602 P.2d 696, 699 (Utah 1979). 
In response to the petition for agency action, the 
Commission issued an order on November 1, 1988, which stated, 
"It is contemplated by the Commission that the parties will 
address in their legal memoranda the threshold issue of whether 
the Commission has the legal authority to grant the relief 
requested . . . ." Petitioners' memoranda accordingly focused 
on the legal issue whether the Commission had authority to 
grant any relief in light of the EBA case and not on the facts 
that might support any particular theory justifying relief. 
Neither side argued factual issues in that context. The 
Commission ruled, as a matter of law, that the rule against 
2. Section 54-7-15 states in part: 
(1) Before seeking judicial review 
of the commission's action, any party 
. . . who is dissatisfied with an order of 
the commission shall meet the requirements 
of this section. 
(2) (a) After any order or decision 
has been made by the commission, 
any party to the action or 
proceeding . . . may apply for 
rehearing of any matters 
determined in the action or 
proceeding. 
(b) No applicant may urge or 
rely on any ground not set forth 
in the application in an appeal 
to any court. 
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retroactive rate making governed and that there was no 
applicable exception to that rule. The Commission stated, "We 
would agree that certain exceptions to the rule are reasonable; 
for example, where it could be demonstrated that the utility 
had misrepresented important ratemaking information or 
otherwise misled regulators." The Commission concluded, 
however, that there was no factual basis for that exception, 
although the Commission had held no factual hearing on the 
issue and the parties were not allowed to focus specifically on 
the factual basis for the exception. 
MCI's and Tel-America's petitions for rehearing stated 
that they were filed for and on behalf of all petitioners and 
all customers of U.S. West. They both asserted, inter alia, 
that the Commission erred in ruling that the rule against 
retroactive rate making barred any relief and that the 
Commission's order denying relief was arbitrary and^ 
capricious. We conclude that petitioners adequately raised the 
issue of utility misconduct and that the issue is properly 
before this Court. 
A utility that misleads or fails to disclose 
information pertinent to whether a rate-making proceeding 
should be initiated or to the proper resolution of such a 
proceeding cannot invoke the rule against retroactive rate 
making to avoid refunding rates improperly collected. The rule 
against retroactive rate making was not intended to permit a 
utility to subvert the integrity of rate-making proceedings. 
See Southwest Gas Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 474 P.2d 379, 
383 (Nev. 1970) . If a utility misleads the Commission or the 
Division by withholding relevant rate-making information, the 
rates fixed by the Commission cannot be based on reasonable 
projections of the utility's revenues and expenses. The rule 
against retroactive rate making was designed to ensure the 
integrity of the rate-making process, not to shelter a 
utility's improperly obtained revenues. 
Moreover, the Commission has the inherent power to 
reopen a rate order if a utility engages in misconduct. In re 
Minnesota Pub. Util. Commission's Initiation of Summary 
Ivesticration. 417 N.W.2d 274, 280-82 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987); see 
also State ex rel. Corbin v. Arizona Corp. Comm'n, 693 P.2d 362 
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1984). 
The Commission stated that the Division's analysis of 
U.S. West's earnings was "complicated during the time period in 
question by changes in the U.S. West accounting system, delays 
in preparation of U.S. West's budget, swings in monthly earning 
reports, etc." That finding, however, does not address whether 
U.S. West acted forthrightly and made timely and accurate 
information available to the Division, the Commission, and the 
Committee so that each could accurately analyze U.S. West's 
actual and projected earnings. Significantly, the Commission's 
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finding does not explain why the rate of return figures finally 
provided by U.S. West pursuant to MCI's interrogatories evaded 
disclosure for so long. The Commission's explanation is simply 
inadequate under the circumstances. In this regard, it is 
significant that the $9 million rate reduction negotiated by 
the Division and U.S. West and approved by the Commission was 
characterized by an independent consulting firm as "clearly 
inadequate." That characterization was substantiated, at least 
to some degree, by the subsequent $26 million stipulated rate 
reduction a mere ten months later. 
We conclude that given the facts appearing on the 
record and the allegations made by MCI and Tel-America to the 
Commission, the Commission's failure to hold a factual hearing 
on the issue of utility misconduct was arbitrary and 
capricious. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4) (iv) (1989). 
III. REFUNDS AND REPARATIONS 
U.S. West argues that petitioners have no remedy in 
the form of reparations under Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-20 
because the availability of reparations is limited by 
§ 54-4-4, which states that rates found to be just and 
reasonable under that section are to be "thereafter observed 
and in force."3 
Section 54-4-4, however, does not preclude a remedy in 
this case. If the rates charged by U.S. West fall within an 
exception to the rule against retroactive rate making in this 
case, they are not just and reasonable. 
Finally, petitioners argue that an authorized rate of 
return imposes an absolute legal ceiling on a utility's profits 
and that all profits in excess of that rate are refundable. As 
a general proposition, we disagree. An authorized rate of 
return is intended to be an estimate of the return on equity 
that investors would require before they would invest in the 
3. U.S. West relies on American Salt Co. v. W.S. Hatch Co., 
748 P.2d 1060 (Utah 1987), for the proposition that the 
Commission has no authority to grant reparations where a 
utility has charged rates that have been previously approved by 
the Commission. American Salt is inapposite. There, we held 
that the Commission was without authority to grant relief from 
a previously approved tariff rate because an application for a 
special commodity rate was not made prior to the hauling in 
question. Therefore, the Commission's order requiring American 
Salt to pay the tariff rate was not disturbed. The case stands 
for the proposition that in the motor common carrier context, 
the Commission may not grant relief from an approved tariff 
rate where an application for a special commodity rate is not 
made prior to the hauling. It does not stand for the general 
proposition U.S. West urges. 
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utility. The rate of return is neither a guarantee of nor a 
limit on profits. A utility should be rewarded for becoming 
more efficient through its own efforts. If the authorized rate 
of return were an absolute ceiling on profits, that objective 
would be subverted. 
Nevertheless, if a utility earns profits in excess of 
its authorized rate of return because of an exception to the 
rule against retroactive rate making, the authorized rate is 
the best available measure of a fair return and earnings in 
excess of that rate are subject to refund. Accordingly, if on 
remand the Tax Reform Act of 1986 is found to have resulted in 
an unforeseeable and extraordinary decrease in expenses or if 
U.S. West is found to have engaged in misconduct, we hold that 
U.S. West's earnings, to the extent they exceeded its 
authorized rate of return established in the" 1985 general rate 
case, should be refunded to U.S. West ratepayers. Any refund 
of excess earnings that might be appropriate, whether by' way of 
reparations, refund, or credit against future rates, must not 
be solely for the named petitioners; all U.S. West's ratepayers 
are entitled to the benefit of any remedy the Commission finds 
to be appropriate. 
Reversed and remanded. 
WE CONCUR: 
Gordon R. Hall, Chief Justice Richard C. Howe, Associate 
Chief Justice 
Christine M. Durham, Justice 
ZIMMERMAN, Justice: (Concurring) 
I join the majority opinion, but write only to make 
explicit what I consider the underlying concern of the majority. 
Today, we inform the Commission that the EBA decision 
does not preclude a retroactive adjustment of rates where they 
are either too high or too low as a result of an extraordinary 
and unforeseeable circumstance. The EBA case still prohibits 
retroactive rate making to address missteps in the rate-setting 
process or the normally occurring unexpected events that may 
lower or raise rates of return over time. Like the majority, I 
am unsure that even the tax changes' very large impact on the 
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utility's income warrants invocation of the "extraordinary and 
unforeseeable" exception to the ban on retroactive rate 
making. However, the Commission should at least-consider the 
issue. 
The profoundly troubling aspect of the matter before 
us is the inexplicable failure of the Division and the 
Commission to do their statutorily mandated jobs in the face of 
overwhelming evidence that the utility had made, and unless the 
Commission took remedial measures solely within its authority 
would continue to make, profits far beyond those anticipated at 
the time of the proceeding which set the current utility rates 
charged consumers. At almost every turn, the conduct of the 
Commission and the Division raises serious questions about 
whether the regulatory authorities—which state law charges 
with seeing that utility rates provide a fair but not 
exorbitant rate of return—were shirking the duty imposed upon 
them by law to check profiteering by the utility. I realize 
that these are harsh words, but from the record before us," it 
is difficult to reach any other conclusion. 
Today's decision provides the" Commission with a tool 
to deal with truly extraordinary and unforeseeable 
circumstances that impact the profits of a utility. Our 
decision also attempts to ensure that the Commission does the 
public's business in the open and that it explains in detail 
the rationale for its actions. However, nothing we can do can 
guarantee a vigorous and effective regulation of monopolistic 
utilities. That responsibility rests with the Commission. 
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APPENDK B 
ORDER OF DECEMBER 10,1987 
DOCKET NO. 87-049-T35 
- ' < . -^ 
- BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH -
•X 
"O 
In the Matter of the Applica-
tion of MOUNTAIN STATES TELE-
PHONE AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY 
for Authority to File Revised 
Tariffs Reducing Annual Re-
venues by $9.02 Million on 
less than 3 0 days Notice 
CASE NO, 87-049-T35 
ORDER APPROVING ACCELERATED 
EFFECTIVE DATE FOR REVISED 
TARIFFS 
By The Commission: 
On December 7, 1987, Mountain States Telephone and 
Telegraph Company ("Mountain Bell") filed with the Commission 
revised tariffs reducing customer rates by $9.02 million and 
requested that the Commission accelerate the implementation of 
such tariffs to December 22, 1987. 
Mountain Bell represents that the reduction proposal 
follows from the informal earnings investigation ordered by this 
Commission and conducted by the Division of Public Utilities with 
the cooperation of Mountain Bell. The tariff rate revisions are 
based upon actual results of operation for 1987. Approximately 
78% of the reductions go to residential customers. 
It appearing that there is good cause to allow the 
proposed rate revisions to be implemented prior to the expiration 
of the 30-day statutory notice period at Section 54-3-3, Utah Code 
for the benefit of Mountain Bell's customers, the Commission will 
make the following order: 
ORDER 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, That the revised 
tariffs with the rate reductions detailed therein and filed by 
Mountain Bell in this matter be and are hereby made effective from 
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December 22, 1987. Any person desiring to protest such effective 
date shall file protest with the Commission prior to that date. 
DATED in Salt Lake City, Utah this 10th day of December, 
1987. 
Brent H. Cameron, Commissioner 
Jam£& M. Byrne, Commissioner 
Attest: 
Stephen C. Hewlett, Commissi ion Secretary 
